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Abstract
The effects of cash dividend policies on the capital accumulation of non-bank firms operating in The United States (S&P 
500), The United Kingdom (FTSE 100), Japan (Nikkei 225), and France (CAC 40) have been investigated in this study. The 
dataset used in the study consists of annual observations between 2010 and 2015. Also, the data were retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuters database. The system in GMM is employed in the econometric estimations in this paper. “Total effect” 
of cash dividend policies on capital accumulation has been bisected as “direct” and “indirect” effects. In this study, we 
call the effect of the cash dividend policies on investments via financial and liquidity constraints as “direct effect” and the 
effect of the policies on the accumulation via market value and business reputation as “indirect effect”.
Obtained results show that the indirect effect is positive, whereas the direct effect is negative. However , the magnitude 
of the direct effect is larger than that of the indirect. Therefore , the total effect of cash dividend policies on the 
accumulation of capital and investments is negative.
The fact that movements in stock prices of firms have an effect on the capital accumulation has shown that the financial 
markets could affect real economic variables. Also,  the results that the cash dividend policies positively affect the market 
value of firms are mounting evidence  to the validity of Signalling and Information Content Approach and Bird in Hand 
Theory. .
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Introduction
Financial management consists of three main factors. These factors are investment, fi-
nancing and dividend policies. While none of these factors is superior or inferior to others, 
they affect each other. Therefore, dividend policies affect capital accumulation via investment 
policies and financial policies.
Cash dividend payouts cause cash outflows from firms. Out-flows of cash resources dec-
rease capability of financing of the firms especially that have limited borrowing opportunity. 
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A decrease in financing capability causes the firms postpone or cancel investments (Fazzari 
et al., 1988, p.183-4), (Cleary, 1999, p.685), (Alti, 2003, p.721), (Moyen, 2004, p.2075) and 
(Moyen and Platikanov, 2013, p.44-5). In addition, even if firms have borrowing capacity, 
there are usually some differences between borrowing cost and the cost of equity. The cost of 
internal funds is almost always lower than the external funds’ cost. (Opler et al., 1999, p.4-9), 
(Chay and Suh, 2009, p.88), (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010, p.247), (Harford et al., 2014, p.978) 
and (Duong et al., 2020, p.2). Thus, if a firm prefers borrowing to equity in the financing of 
investment, the firm’s weighted average cost of capital will be raised, and as a result of this, 
the firm’s investment will go down. On the other hand, lots of studies in the relevant literature 
state that excess cash holding firms have been faced with the agency problem such as Jensen 
(1986), Harford (1999), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008) and Denis 
and Sibilkov (2010).
Within the frame of explanations in the previous paragraph, many studies have discussed 
the relationship between growth opportunities, investment decisions and cash dividend po-
licy. Also, lots of papers have presented theoretical and empirical evidence about the relevant 
field. In  this framework, Abor and Amidu (2006)  determined a negative relationship bet-
ween dividend payouts and growth. Also, a negative relationship between dividend yield and 
the growth opportunities was  stated by Gul (1999), Gul and Kealey (1999) and (Danila et 
al., 2020). (Harakeh, 2020) shows that dividend policy has a constraining effect on corporate 
investment via information asymmetry and agency problems. Besides, a negative relationship 
has been found between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy by Abor and 
Bokpin (2010) and Jabbouri (2016). On the other hand, some studies in the literature have 
reached different results about the relationship between growth and dividend policy. For ins-
tance, there is no significant relationship between dividend policy and firm growth according 
to Ressy and Chariri (2013). Also, Ghosh and Sun (2014)   demonstrated that there is a sta-
tistically significant positive relationship between externally financed growth and dividend 
payments for REITs.  
It’s thought that dividend policies affect stock prices and there are many theoretical app-
roaches to the explanation of this effect. The approaches are listed below:
• Irrelevance Theory: This theory suggests that the market value of the firms and 
the stock prices determined by the expected return and any other variable cannot 
influence the market value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, p.265). In this context, 
dividend policies do not affect the market value of the firms. 
• Signalling and Information Content Approach: This approach is based on infor-
mation asymmetry and imperfection of the financial markets (Ross, 1977, p.39). 
Firms’ managers have more information than the stockholders about firms’ current 
and future situations. For this reason, dividend policies provide information to the 
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market and stockholders. An increase in dividend payout ratio of a firm creates an 
expectation that increases the firm’s income in the future. And so, the firm’s market 
value is influenced by the expectation as positive. From this point of view, a raise 
in the dividend payout ratio increases the market value and stock price of the firms. 
• Bird in Hand Theory1: Stockholders would prefer the profits made by the firms 
being under their own control rather than the firms’ control. Because, it’s dubious 
whether or not the firms will distribute the profit in the future and the future inc-
ludes uncertainty and risk. Therefore, stockholders would like the distribution of 
profits as immediate as possible. Within this scope, the stocks of firms with high 
dividend payout ratio are traded at a lower discount rate than the stocks of firms 
with low dividend payout ratio. 
• Tax Differential Theory: This theory is based on the idea that the capital gains and 
dividends are taxed at different rates. For instance, if the public authority excised 
dividends at a higher rate than capital gains, stocks of firms with high dividend pa-
yout ratio would be traded at a discounted price (vice versa). Then, the difference in 
the rate of taxation between dividends and capital gains can affect stock prices and 
dividend decisions of the firms (Farrar and Selwyn, 1967, p.453-4) and (Brennan, 
1970, p.426).   
• Clientele Effect2: Like the whole economy, stock market investors also consist of 
different social groups and levels of income. Each social and income group are  in 
different tax brackets and expectations. For this reason, some of the investor groups 
prefer stocks of firms with high dividend payout ratios, and the others prefer stocks 
of firms with low dividend payout ratios or non-dividend-payers. In that case, ac-
cording to the Clientele Effect, whether dividend payments increase share prices 
can’t be generalized and this depends on dividend expectation of investors. 
• Catering Theory: Actually, Catering Theory is a continuation and generalised form 
of Clientele Effect. Implementation of dividend policies by firms must satisfy ex-
pectations and serve the interests of shareholders according to Catering Theory. 
And different from the Clientele Effect, Catering Theory suggests that expectations 
and interests of shareholders change over time. Therefore, before deciding a divi-
dend premium on stock prices, firm managers must also be aware of the change in 
shareholders’ expectations and interests, in short, they must give the shareholders 
what they currently want. (Fama and French, 2001), (Baker and Wurgler 2004a, 
p.287) and (Baker and Wurgler, 2004b, p.1160-1).   
1  The Theory was constructed by Myron J. Gordon and John Lintner. For details; Gordon (1959) and Lintner (1962).  
2  For details; Allen, F. and Michaely, R. (2003), and Berk, J. and DeMarzo, P. (2017).  
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There is a considerable amount of empirical evidence that a relationship exists betwe-
en stock price movements and capital accumulation of firms. Bischoff (1970) puts forward 
that firms’ dividend-price ratio is the best measure of the cost of capital. Bosworth (1975) 
suggests that Bischoff’s results are valid just in the long run. If the stock markets adjust 
themselves so quickly, because temporary price movements of stocks at the short-term can’t 
influence the fundamentals of firms, the managers won’t scrap investment plans (Bosworth, 
1975, p.286). Firm managers are willing to make their investment when the expected returns 
on marginal investment plans are higher than the shares yield on the existing capital stock. 
On the other hand, the rational managers would purchase either their or other firms’ shares 
when marginal investment projects had a lower return than that of shares. (Fisher and Merton, 
1984, p.36-41). All these results are corroborated by Barro (1990), Galeotti and Schiantarelli 
(1994) and Durham (2000), while Blanchard et al. (1993) and Bolbol and Omran (2005) are 
in opposition to the results. 
The relationship between growth opportunities, the investment decision, capital accumu-
lation of firms and dividend policy has been investigated in a single-sided approach in the 
literature up to now. However, we investigate the relationship between dividend policy and 
capital accumulation with a dual-sided view. Therefore, our main contribution to the literature 
is to investigate cash dividend policy with a dual-sided view as the cash constraining effect of 
dividend policy and the price effect of dividend policy on capital accumulation.  
In the light of the explanations above, on the one hand, dividend policies influence invest-
ment and capital accumulation of firms via capability of financing or financing constraints 
which are  called   “direct effects” in this paper, and on the other hand, dividend policies can 
affect the market value of the firms. At this point, considering that the firms’ market value 
is related to investment, dividend policies must affect capital accumulation via stock prices, 
which is called  “indirect effects” in the paper. From this point of view, the primary aim and 
the main contribution of this study is: (1) to distinguish the effects of dividend policies on 
capital accumulation as “direct effects” and “indirect effects”, and also (2) to detect the total 
effects of dividend policies on the capital accumulation. Therefore, we have developed the 
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis - I: Cash dividend payments affect the capital accumulation and growth of 
firms with two-ways as “direct” and “indirect”.
Hypothesis - II: The direct effect of cash dividend payments on capital accumulation and 
growth is negative.
Hypothesis - III: The indirect effect of cash dividend payments on capital accumulation 
and growth is positive.
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Hypothesis - IV: The mathematical sign of the total effect of cash dividend payments on 
capital accumulation and growth varies  depending on which effect is greater.
The next section describes the models that reveal the effects of dividend policies on the ca-
pital accumulation and market value of firms along with variables and dataset. The employed 
econometric method is discussed, and the empirical results reached are reported in Section 3. 
Finally, Section 4 includes concluding remarks of the study. 
Models and Dataset
We established two different models in the present study with the help of the theoretical 
approaches and studies from the relevant literature. One of the models (Model (1)) has aimed 
for the explanation of the effects of dividend policies on the capital accumulation. The p urpo-
se of the other model (Model (2)) is to reveal dividend policies’ effects on the market value of 
firms. Abbreviations of the variables used in Model (1), Model (2) and all of the result tables 
have been presented Table 1 which takes part in “Tables” of the study.
Table 1
Abbreviations of the Variables Used in the Result Tables
Variables Abbreviations
Constant C
(Δ(Capital Stock) / Capital Stock) δK/K
(Market Value / Book Value) MV/BV
(Cash Flow / Capital Stock) CF/K
(Sales / Capital Stock) S/K
(Cleary, 1999) CLRY
(Δ(Stock Price) / Stock Price) δP/P
(Cash Dividend Paid / Total Profit) CDPR
(Return On Equity) ROE
(Leverage Ratio) LR
(Δ(Total Profit) / Total Profit) δπ/π
(Δ(Total Assets) / Total Assets) δTA/TA
2010 Dummy 2011 Dummy t – 10 t – 11
2012 Dummy 2013 Dummy t – 12 t – 13
2014 Dummy 2015 Dummy t – 14 t – 15
United States Dummy United Kingdom Dummy d – US d – UK
Japan Dummy France Dummy d – JP d – FR
Model (1) is as follows:
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  is the logarithmic difference in total capital of the firms between periods t and t-1. 
The variable indicates the rate of the firms’ capital accumulation.
  is used as investment opportunity set beside Tobin’s q3 by some studies from 
existing literature such as Aivazian et al. (2003). Higher investment opportunities must be a 
reason for higher actual investments. In that case, the relationship between  and invest-
ments of firms should be in the same direction. Therefore, we expect that the sign of the co-
efficient (β1.1) will be positive.  
 is the representation of liquidity and cash making capability of the firms. There 
is a considerable amount of study which reveals that liquidity or cash flow affects firms’ in-
vestment, at least dividend payments and financial constraints. Fazzari et al. (1988) and Agca 
and Mozumdar (2017), respectively, are two of the most prominent and the latest instances of 
relevant literature. Cash-rich firms can make more investment expenditures than cash-poor 
ones. Thus, β1.2 must be positive as supported by Fazzari et al. (1988), Moyen (2004), Hirth 
and Viswanatha (2011) and Agca and Mozumdar (2017) like many others in the existing 






  consists of sales revenue over the capital stock. The variable stands for the market 
demand for the goods produced by the firms. Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) claim that 
the market demand determines the capital accumulation, and the capital accumulation moves 










   
shows up as a Keynesian variable which is the indicator of demand. Within this scope, we 





   and the capital accumulation.  
(CLRY)  is a financing constraint index4 revealed by Cleary (1999). The decrease in the va-
lues of Cleary financing constraint index reduces the firms’ financing capacity. On the other 
hand, an increase in the financing capacity must enhance the investment expenditures and 





  is the logarithmic difference in stock prices of firms from period t-1 to t. As we 
3  Tobin q;  . There are some measurement errors in the calculation of Tobin’s q. , instead of Tobin’s q, is selected as a 
variable which represents the investment opportunity set in the model due to the dubious situation of Tobin’s q.  
4  Calculation of Cleary financing index takes part in the “Appendix” of the study. See for details; Cleary (1999).  
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mentioned in the introduction of the study, stock price movements can affect the accumula-
tion of capital. The stock prices or the market value is an indicator of the business reputation 
of the firms. Also, an increase in the market valuation raises the business reputation and 
commercial credit of the firms. The firms with high business reputation can reach sources of 
credit easier and at a lower cost than others. Therefore, stock price movements must affect 
capital accumulation in the same direction. For these reasons, we anticipate that the sign of





  is used as an independent variable in the Model (2) that is 
established in order to expose indirect effects of dividend policies on capital accumulation. 
( )CDPR  is the amount of cash dividend paid over the total profit of firms. The variable that 
is called “cash dividend payout ratio” is used in the Model (1) and Model (2) as a proxy for 
cash dividend policies of firms. Cash dividend payouts cause cash outflows from firms, and 
by doing so decrease cash resources of the firms. Therefore, for Model (1), it can be expected 
that there is a negative relationship between cash dividend payout ratio and the capital accu-
mulation rate of the firms. On the other hand, for Model (2), it depends on the validity of the 
theoretical approaches which are used in the investigation on the relationship between stock 
price movements and the dividend policies. In consequence, there is no expectation about 
whether a positive or negative relationship exists between stock returns and the dividend 
policies,  if there is a significant relationship.   
Model (2) is as follows: 
( )ROE  can be defined as the net income over the shareholder’s equity of the firms. Also, 
ROE has been used as an indicator of firms’ performance in the relevant literature as well 
as return on assets, net profit margin, and earnings per share. An improvement in a firm’s 
performance must raise  the stock price of the firm. Therefore, we can expect that β2.2 will 
be positive. 
( )LR  shows   how much capital comes from external sources and equities. The leverage 
ratio is also known as the financial leverage ratio. Also, the leverage ratio has been obtained 
by the total debt over the total equity of the firms. Firms’ indebtedness goes up when there is 
an increase in the leverage ratio of firms. Going up (going down) in the indebtedness means 
that there is an increase (decrease) in the risk of firms’  payments failure . Hence, the relati-
onship between leverage ratio and stock return or β2.3 coefficient must be negative in theory. 






  is the logarithmic difference in total profits of firms from period t-1 to t. As explai-
ned before, the Irrelevance Theory asserts that stock or market prices of firms are determined 
by the expected returns. If the assertion of the t heory is true, the coefficient of the variable 
will be positive. In other words, we can say that when the firm’s profit increases, the stock 





   is the logarithmic difference in total assets of the firms from period t-1 to t. The 
variable represents the proportional change in firms’ size over time. The increase in total as-






  or the relationship between stock return and change in total assets of the firms must 
be positive. 
Lagged values of stock returns were used as an independent variable in the models that 
are established for the explanation of current stock returns by lots of studies in the relevant 
literature like Zhou and Ruland (2006) and Huang et al. (2009). Indeed, shareholders pay re-
gard to the previous returns of shares when investing in a stock. Within this scope, Model (2) 
established by us, includes a variable that has  one period of lagged values of stock returns. 
On the other hand, each economy has different agendas, cycles, and also business, political 
and social processes  each year. Thus, Model (1) and (2) have included both the time dummies 
and the market dummy variables. 
The dataset used in the study consists of annual observations between 2010 and 2015 of 
683 non-bank firms selected from S&P 500, FTSE 100, Nikkei 225 and CAC 40 indexes. In 
the selection process of the firms, special attention has been paid that the firms had been listed 
at least once in the relevant indexes, through the period from 2010 to 2015. In this context, 
respectively, 372, 87, 184 and 40 of 683 non-bank firms come from S&P 500, FTSE 100, 
Nikkei 225 and CAC 40 indexes. The total market cap ratio of the relevant indexes and their 
countries is above 70 % of the world’s market cap. Also , the relevant countries are the four 
biggest markets all over the world in market cap. Within this scope, for their representative 
power to the world, we have selected the markets for our analyses.5 At the end of the section, 
we would like to point out that all of the data used in analysis (1) and (2) were taken from the 
Thomson Reuters (Datastream) database.
5 For details; https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/what-the-world-would-look-like-if-countries-were-the-size-
of-their-stock-markets?utm_content=bufferba473&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_
campaign=buffer. 
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Econometric Method and Empirical Results
First of all, we should indicate that there are some missing values in the dataset, which 
means that the type of dataset is an unbalanced panel. First-differences of variables augment 
missing observations in the unbalanced panel datasets. Two equations are constituted by the 
lagged values of first-differenced variables for the level equations and the lagged values of le-
vel variables for the first-differenced equations.  Then, both equations are estimated together 
to minimise the missing observations. The econometric method that estimated the equations 
both together is called the  “System in Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)”.6 On the 
other hand , the number of the cross-section (683) is larger than the number of time series 
(6) of the dataset.   Also, both Model (1) and (2) include endogenous variables. The System 
in GMM has been preferred in the econometric estimation of the models due to the above 
mentioned reasons. 
The econometric analyses7 were  made in Stata 13 software using the “xtabond2” com-
mand that was  developed by Roodman. Roodman’s command makes an estimation that is 
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Also, it allows more diagnostic tests than the 
other GMM estimator commands. (Roodman, 2009, p.128-9). In addition to them, we have 
used the technique developed by Windmeijer8 to make an efficient calculation of standard 
errors.  
Summary statistics in  Table 2 has been obtained  from the annual data belonging  to 683 




DEVELOPED MARKETS (US – UK – JP – FR)
Analysis (1)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
δK/K 0.03 0.187 - 2.207 1.573
MV/BV 2.463 6.189 - 326.08 52.497
CF/K (-1) 0.147 0.098 - 0.615 1.528
S/K (-1) 1.294 0.912 0.089 18.096
CLRY 0.205 0.308 - 0.926 1.319
δP/P 0.058 0.258 - 0.886 0.945
CDPR 0.442 3.019 - 3.09 131.1
Analysis (2)
δP/P 0.05 0.29 - 2.558 1.409
6  For details; Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
7  Outlier observations at the dataset were determined with the “bacon” command. And then, the determined observations 
as outliers were removed from the dataset. See for details Weber (2010) about the “bacon” command.
8  See for details of Windmeijer Correction; Windmeijer (2005).   
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
CDPR 0.441 2.994 - 3.09 131.102
ROE 0.149 0.351 - 13.109 10.897
LR 0.259 0.146 0 0.795
δπ/π 0.081 0.305 - 1.016 1.21
δTA/TA 0.021 0.102 - 0.341 0.404
δP/P (-1) 0.076 0.279 - 2.558 1.409
The expression “(-1)” next to the variables shows that one lagged values of the variables are used.
The firms in the database had accumulated capital average 3 % per year during  the period 
of 2010-2015. Also,  the stock prices of the firms had gone up on average 5 % per year during 
the same period. Furthermore, the firms had paid on average 44.15 % of their total profits as 
cash dividend per year of the relevant period.  
Correlations between the variables used in Model (1) and (2) are shown in  Table 3. Vari-
ance inflation factor tests9 show that there is a considerable risk of multicollinearity due to the 
high correlations between some variables. Therefore, CF/K, δP/P, and CDPR were normali-
sed at Analysis (1). On the other hand, CDPR, LR, and δπ/π were normalised at Analysis (2). 
Multicollinearity was not determined by the employed tests of variance inflation factor after 
the normalisation process of relevant variables.
Table 3
Correlation Matrices
DEVELOPED MARKETS (US – UK – JP – FR)
Analysis (1)
δK/K MV/BV CF/K (-1) S/K (-1) CLRY δP/P CDPR
δK/K 1
MV/BV 0.233 1
CF/K (-1) 0.166 0.006 1
S/K (-1) 0.014 0.146 0.032 1
CLRY 0.37 0.393 0.048 - 0.291 1
δP/P 0.103 0.146 - 0.092 - 0.073 0.099 1
CDPR - 0.071 0.005 - 0.01 - 0.021 - 0.026 - 0.031 1
Analysis (2)
δP/P CDPR ROE LR δπ/π δTA/TA δP/P (-1)
δP/P 1
CDPR - 0.125 1
ROE 0.169 - 0.027 1
LR - 0.163 0.155 0.037 1
δπ/π 0.241 - 0.299 0.022 - 0.065 1
δTA/TA 0.233 - 0.092 0.254 0.06 0.111 1
δP/P (-1) 0.098 - 0.052 0.246 - 0.091 0.085 0.071 1
The expression “(-1)” next to the variables show that one lagged values of the variables are used.
Summary statistics and correlation matrices regarding variables used in the analyses were 
represented in  Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. Results reached from the econometric analy-
ses are going to be demonstrated in the rest of the paper. 
9  Variance Inflation Factor Tests take part in Appendix of the paper.  
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Results of the econometric analyses of both Model (1) and (2) estimated by System in 
GMM fall into  Table 4. As it can be seen in the table, the signs of all coefficients of vari-
ables are in accordance with the theoretical expectations. Also, the coefficients of variables 
are statistically significant. Therefore, when the first variable of Model (1), namely MV/BV, 
increases, the rate of the capital accumulation goes up.
Table 4
Effects of Cash Dividend Policies on the Capital Accumulation and Firms’ Market Value
DEVELOPED MARKETS (US – UK – JP – FR) 
(US – GB – JP – FR)
Variable System in GMM (1) Variable System in GMM (2)
C C - 0.103** (0.048)
MV/BV 0.012* (0.007) CDPR 0.124*** (0.032)
CF/K (-1) 0.062** (0.025) ROE 1.292*** (0.187)
S/K (-1) 0.035* (0.021) LR - 0.137*** (0.05)
CLRY 0.275*** (0.78) δπ/π 0.247*** (0.039)
δP/P 0.115*** (0.027) δTA/TA 0.36*** (0.086)
CDPR - 0.051* (0.029) δP/P (-1) - 0.251*** (0.097)
t – 10 - t – 10 -
t – 11 0.035** (0.014) t – 11 -
t – 12 - 0.003 (0.011) t – 12 - 0.153*** (0.018)
t – 13 - 0.025** (0.012) t – 13
t – 14 - 0.051*** (0.008) t – 14 - 0.152*** (0.018)
t – 15 - t – 15 - 0,253*** (0,018)
d – US - 0.191*** (0.054) d – US 0.006 (0.023)
d – UK - 0.204*** (0.054) d – UK -
d – JP - 0.136*** (0.038) d – JP 0.099*** (0.024)
d – FR - 0.165*** (0.047) d – FR 0.048* (0.029)
Regression Diagnostic Tests Regression Diagnostic Tests
Test Test Statistic Prob. Value Test Test Statistic Prob. Value
Wald Test 422.31 0.000 Wald Test 562.84 0.000
AR (1) - 7.93 0.000 AR (1) - 4.08 0.000
AR (2) - 1.28 0.201 AR (2) - 1.22 0.223
AR (3) - 1.29 0.198 AR (3) - -
Sargan Test 35.95 0.056 Sargan Test 36.25 0.052
Hansen Test 22.62 0.542 Hansen Test 23.78 0.474
Data Set Cross Section = 580  Number of Observation = 2194 Data Set
Cross Section = 380 
 Number of Observation = 1275
The numbers in brackets show the standard deviation of the coefficients at the table. “***”, “**” and “*” symbols in-
dicate  respectively, 1 %, 5 % and 10 % statistical significance of the coefficients. Also, exclusive Hansen Tests’ results 
belonging  to variables are reported in the Appendix of the paper. On the other hand , the rate of capital accumulation 
(δK/K) is independent variable at the analysis (1) and proportional change in firms’ value (δP/P) is independent variab-
le at the analysis (2). Finally, the expression “(-1)” next to the variables shows  that one lagged values of the variables 
are used in the regressions. 
An increase in CF/K and S/K enhances the accumulation of capital at the subsequent term. 
However, the sensitivity of capital accumulation to CF/K is almost two times higher than that 
of S/K. Also, CLRY can affect the capital accumulation of firms. According to this result, an 
increase in the constraint of firms’ financing reduces capital accumulation of the firms. In this 
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context, it can be said that the Cleary financial constraint index is a useful indicator of finan-
cial constraints in view of the statistical significance of the coefficient. In addition to them, 
CLRY is the most sensitive variable to the capital accumulation in comparison with CF/K and 
S/K. Achieved results on the variables CF/K, S/K and CLRY are consistent with Fazzari et 
al. (1988), Moyen (2004), Bolbol and Omran (2005), Moyen and Platikanov (2013) and the 
overwhelming majority of relevant literature. 
An increase in ROE, which is an indicator of the firm performance, enhances the market 
value of firms. While our results about ROE are consistent with a part of literature like Ahsan 
(2012), they are incompatible with some other studies like Anwaar (2016). On the other side, 
when the indicator of firms’ indebtedness LR goes up, stock prices of firms come down. So, 
we can say that there is a negative relationship between the level of indebtedness and the 
market values of the firms. While the result is supported by some studies in the literature like 
Shah and Noreen (2016), some others, like Zhou and Ruland (2006), stand against it. 
δπ/π and δTA/TA influence the market values of the firms positively. According to these 
results, if a firm’s profits increase 1 %, the market value of the firm goes up about 0.247 %. 
Likewise, if the firm’s total assets increase 1 %, stock prices of the firm rise roughly 0.36 
%. Our results about profits and total assets of firms are consistent with Huang et al. (2009), 
Hunjra et al. (2014), and Shah and Noreen (2016).  
According to the  results in this paper, when the increase in the market value of the firm 
is 100 %, the capital accumulation rate of a firm raises about 11.5 %. Then, it can be said that 
pricing in the financial markets affects real economic indicators like investment expenditures, 
credit costs and capabilities via the business reputation of corporations. Also, movements in 
the market values of firms have a negative effect on the subsequent market values of the firms 
to about  25 % of the stock price movements. On the other hand, if a firm distributed all of 
its profits to shareholders as cash dividend, the capital accumulation rate of the firm would 
come down about 5.1 %. Also, the market value of the firm would rise about 12.4 % in the 
same fiscal year.   
Model (1) was established to determine the direct effects of the cash dividend on the ca-
pital accumulation. Also, as noted earlier, Model (2) is a mediation model that is an attempt 
to reveal indirect effects of the cash dividend on capital accumulation. Mediation models’ 
independent variables take part as a dependent variable in the base models. If there are two 
equations, and one of them is a mediation equation like below, direct effects must be calcula-
ted as follows according to Sobel (1982).  
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1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1Y C X X X .....= + β + β + β + + ε  
( )33
Direct Effect : X Yβ⇒ →  
2 a a a b b c 3 aX C X X X .....= + β + β + β + + ε    
( ) ( )c 23 2
Indirect Effect : X X Yβ β⇒ → →
indirect c 2 3 indirect, Total Effect :β = β ×β β + β    
In the present case, direct effects, indirect effects, and the sum of the effects of the cash 
dividend policies on the capital accumulation of firms are in Table 5.
Table 5
Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Cash Dividend Policies on Capital Accumulation
Variables Developed Markets (US – GB – JP – FR)
Direct Effects CDPR → δK/K - 0.051
δP/P → δK/K 0.115
CDPR → δP/P 0.124
Indirect Effects (CDPR → δP/P) × (δP/P → δK/K) 0.124 × 0.115 = 0.014
Sum of the Effects Direct Effects + Indirect Effects - 0.051 + 0.014 =  - 0.037
It is clear from  Table 5 that the direct effect of cash dividend policies on capital accu-
mulation is about negative 5.1 %. Also, the indirect effect of cash dividend policies upon the 
capital accumulation is obtained by multiplying the influence of cash dividend policies upon 
the market values of firms by the impact of market values on the accumulation of capital. 
Therefore, the cash dividend policies have a positive indirect effect on the capital accumulati-
on of about 1.4 %, which is obtained by multiplying 12.4 % by 11.5 % as pointed out above. 
Finally, the total effect of the cash dividend policies on the accumulation consists of the 
summation of direct and indirect effects. Hereunder, the total effect, - 5.1 % (direct effect) 
plus 1.4 % (indirect effect), is equal to -3.7 %. In that case, cash dividend policies have about 
3.7 % negative effect on the capital accumulation.  
Conclusion
The effects of cash dividend policies on the capital accumulation of non-bank firms ope-
rating in The United States (S&P 500), The United Kingdom (FTSE 100), Japan (Nikkei 225) 
and  France (CAC 40) have been investigated in this study. Different from relevant literatu re, 
in this paper we bisected the “total effect” of cash dividend policies on investments or capital 
accumulation as “direct effect” and “indirect effect”. 
Cash dividend payouts cause cash outflows from firms, and as a result of this, they operate 
under these  financial constraints. For this reason, firms squeeze investment expenditures 
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and reduce capital accumulation as long as there is an increase in cash dividend payout ratio 
which is used as the dividend policy variable. In the study, we  called the effect of the cash 
dividend policies on investments via financial and liquidity constraints  “direct effect”. 
On the other hand, cash dividend payouts have a positive effect on market values or stock 
prices of firms. Also, according to the empirical results, market values of firms affect invest-
ment expenditures and capital accumulation via business reputation and capital cost. Therefo-
re, cash dividend policies can influence the capital accumulation indirectly. In this paper, we 
called the effect of cash dividend policies on capital accumulation via market value, business 
reputation, and the capital cost   “indirect effect”. 
The “total effect” of cash dividend policies on capital accumulation consists of the sum-
mation of “direct” and “indirect” effects. The “indirect effect” is positive, whereas the “direct 
effect” is negative. In addition to this, the magnitude of the direct effect is larger than that of 
the indirect. Thus, the “total effect” of cash dividend policies on the accumulation of capital 
and investments is negative in our sample, but it is not as much as the “direct effect”. Within 
this framework, obtained results in our study about the “total effect” are consistent with re-
sults of the study that Abor and Amidu (2006), Gul and Kealey (1999), Danila et al. (2020) 
and Harakeh (2020). On the other hand , we could not find  satisfactory evidence to support 
Ressy and Chariri (2013) and Ghosh and Sun (2014).
 The fact that movements in stock prices of firms have an effect on the capital accumula-
tion has shown that the financial markets could affect real economic variables like the invest-
ment expenditures. Also, the empirical results that the cash dividend policies positively affect 
the market value of firms are mounting evidence  to the validity of Signalling and Information 
Content Approach and Bird in Hand Theory. 
On the other hand , stock prices have been influenced by the return of firms. However, 
according to the obtained results, the market values or stock prices of the firms have been af-
fected by not only returns but also some other variables. Therefore, our results have partially 
supported the Irrelevance theory in terms of  the relationship between return and stock price 
of firms.    
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Appendix
A.1. Cleary Financing Constraint Index
( )
Cleary 0.017 Current Ratio 0.0003 Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio
Slack0.0007 3.904 Net Income Margin
Net Fixed Assets
Sales
0.467 0.439 Leverage Ratio
Sales
⇒ = − × + ×
+ × + ×
∆
+ × − ×
( )
( )
Slack Cash and Short Term Investment 0.5 Inventory
0.7 Accounts Receivable Notes Payable
⇒ = +
+ −
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A.2. Variance Inflation Factor Tests (VIF Tests)
Table A.2.1



















Istanbul Business Research 50/2
254
A.3. The Results of Exclusive Hansen Tests
Table A.3.1
Exclusive Hansen Test Results of Variables at Analysis (1)
Explanation Test Test Statistic Probability Value
GMM Instruments for Levels
Hansen 10.58 0.102
Difference 12.05 0.845
Gmm (CF/K, lag (3 4))
Hansen 12 0.8
Difference 10.62 0.156
Gmm (S/K, lag (4 4))
Hansen 17.97 0.391
Difference 4.65 0.702
Gmm (CLRY, lag (3 4))
Hansen 18.8 0.34
Difference 3.82 0.8
Gmm (δP/P, lag (2 2)c)
Hansen 22.54 0.488
Difference 0.08 0.776
Gmm (CDPR, lag (3 5))
Hansen 16.06 0.246
Difference 6.57 0.833
Instrument Variables (t-10, 
t-11, t-12, t-13, t-14, t-15, 




Exclusive Hansen Test Results of Variables at Analysis (2)
Explanation Test Test Statistic Probability Value
GMM Instruments for Levels
Hansen 12.14 0.206
Difference 11.65 0.706
Gmm (CDPR, lag (1 2))
Hansen 12.27 0.725
Difference 11.52 0.174
Gmm (ROE, lag (1 5)c)
Hansen 21.13 0.39
Difference 2.66 0.617
Gmm (LR, lag (4 5)c)
Hansen 23.54 0.316
Difference 0.24 0.97
Gmm (δπ/π, lag (2 3))
Hansen 20.83 0.106
Difference 2.96 0.982
Gmm (δTA/TA, lag (1 4)c)
Hansen 21.96 0.343
Difference 1.83 0.767
Gmm (δP/P, lag (4 4))
Hansen 20.84 0.346
Difference 2.94 0.709
Instrument Variables (t-10, 
t-11, t-12, t-13, t-14, t-15, 
d-US, d-UK, d-JP, d-FR)
Hansen 15.56 0.623
Difference 8.22 0.222
